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Abstract 
The purpose of this study was to assess the possibilities of bankruptcy and financial statement fraud in Ghana’s 
banking sector. An investigation of the financial statements of the banks for the period 2015 to 2018 was made 
with the use of Altman’s (2000), Taffler’s (1983), and Beneish (1999) models. The Altman (2000) and Taffler 
(1983) models are predictors of insolvency or bankruptcy. To unveil the possibilities of financial statement fraud, 
this study used the Beneish [1999], model. The examination of the bank's annual financial reports with the Beneish 
model revealed the banks were engaged in earnings manipulation. The Altman [2000] and Taffler [1983] models, 
on the other hand, brought to light the financial soundness of the banks with an average of 14 (74%) and 18 (95%) 
of the 19 selected banks correctly classified into the safe zone with an impressive Z-Score performance according 
to Altman and Taffler’s models respectively. The study, therefore recommends that, if the Beneish model is applied 
well together with the failure prediction models by researchers, it can provide a reliable finding for policymaking. 
Also, auditors, investors, management, and stockholders when making good use of the Beneish model, it can 
provide potential ‘red flags’ for further investigation to be carried out for better audit assignment 
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1. Introduction 
For decades, financial bankruptcy prediction has been a central topic in both practical and academic corporate 
finance. From a practical perspective, creditors, stockholders, senior management, and auditors are all interested 
in failure prediction because it greatly influences their decision making. Also, financial bankruptcy leads to 
serious social problems, such as economic depression, financial crisis and unemployment particularly if several 
institutions run into financial bankruptcy at the same time.  
There are several names attributed to the financial ill-health of an institution, specific meanings have been 
given specifically to described ill-health of an institution. Names that have been notably used to describe the 
financial ill-health of an institution include corporate/business failure, insolvency, and bankruptcy. Adeyemi [2011] 
defined bankruptcy situations to mean having financial operational and managerial difficulties. Vuran, [2009] 
defined business failure as the situation when the institution cannot pay lenders, shareholders, and suppliers, etc., 
or the institution is bankrupt according to the law. Baharin and Sentosa, [2013] defined financially bankrupt firms 
or banks as institutions that are experiencing financial difficulties to maintain their normal operations.  
Usdin and Bloom [2012] have identified nine signs of financial bankruptcy as follows: the company cannot 
timely pay for creditors; the company suffer a significant event that will not recur; the liabilities of the company 
are greater than its assets; the company’s lender or bank threatens to shut down operations of the company; the 
company’s business model no longer becomes viable; a union threatens some type of action against the company; 
the company is sued in collection matters; a major supplier threatens to terminate services to the company, and the 
company cannot perform its contracts on time or cannot perform its contracts at all. Sami [2013] indicated that 
financial bankruptcy is tied to cash flow problems and incapacity of debt settlement. The institution will meet three 
difficulties: it loses the right to make decisions; the financial bankruptcy can reduce the demand for the product of 
the institution and increase production costs, and managers require a considerable amount of time to solve the 
financial bankruptcy.  
Chen and Zhuang [2014] indicated that the financial state of a company often cannot be observed directly, 
but only some indicators associated with the financial state can be observed. In their study, they established a 
model that is used to describe the correlation between the signal indicators and the financial state of a firm. Baharin 
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and Sentosa [2013] indicated that the institutions that generate a lower rate of return compared to the market rate 
for similar investments, having average return that is lower than the cost of capital, and/or do not have enough 
revenue to meet their expenses can be considered as experiencing business failures.  
According to Kammani, [2017], the banking system is considered one of the pillars of the financial system 
of any economy. The banking system ensures the sustainable economic development and welfare of any society 
by forming adequate capital and allocating funds efficiently for investment projects, and payment for services. 
Financial institutions in general and banks, in particular, bring together those who require funding and those who 
possess surplus funding [Kumari, 2017; Choudhry, 2018]. In developing countries like Ghana, the banking sector 
is even much more important. According to Sarker, Ghosh & Palit, [2015], greater financial inclusion can have a 
positive effect on the lives of the poor in the country, Moreover, financial health appraisal of financial institutions 
in general and banks, in particular, is critical [Mwawughanga & Ochiri, 2017]. So, financial bankruptcy in the 
banking sector has much more dangerous results than it has in the business sector.   
Recent studies indicate there is bankruptcy throughout the world. During these last years, the annual flow of 
bankruptcy did not stop increasing and this trend becomes more marked during periods of crisis [Sami, 2013]. 
Specific reference to some renowned corporate failure can be made of General Motors (GM), Chrysler, American 
International Group Inc., Delta Airline Limited Xerox, AIG, Freddie, WorldCom, Lehman Brothers, and Enron 
Corp [Mclntyre & Ogg, 2008]. In Ghana, previous cases of bankruptcy include Bank for Housing and Construction, 
Ghana Co-operative Bank, National Savings and Credit Bank, UT Bank, DKM financial and Gateway 
Broadcasting Services [Appiah, 2011]. A case of corporate failure that is still fresh on the minds of Ghanaians is 
the collapse of UniBank Ghana Limited, Royal Bank Limited, Beige Bank Limited, Sovereign Bank Limited, and 
Construction Bank Limited because of liquidity and solvency challenges. Among the reasons cited for the collapse 
of these Banks were the Corporate governance issues, Asset Quality, liquidity and solvency challenges faced by 
the banks [Bank of Ghana, 2018].   
Many studies support the need for the expectation of financial bankruptcy and the likely occurrence of 
financial bankruptcy and failure of banks. Glautier and Underdown [2001] point out that an early warning signal 
of probable bankruptcy and failure will enable both management and investors to take preventive actions. The 
warning signs and Z score model have the ability to help management for expecting problems early to avoid 
financial difficulties [Ray, 2011]. The expectation of failure as early as possible with sound accuracy will enable 
firms to take action to reduce the costs of bankruptcy, avoid failure to all stakeholders and contribute to achieving 
the business and financial environment stability [Gharaibeh et al., 2013].  
Business news and Bank of Ghana Annual report on the Ghanaian banking sector within the last three years 
[2016 to 2019] reveal that over 16 banks in Ghana have been creased up or collapse completely as they were 
fronting financial difficulties.  Ghanaian UT bank started in 1997as a financial house named as Unique trust 
financial services. According to Ghanatrade, [2017] the financial services house purchased a former bank that is 
called BPI bank in June 2010 and was listed on the Ghanaian Stock Exchange as UT Bank, yet after six years, it 
has folded up. In 2009, Capital bank was established as savings and loans and got a license to operate as a bank in 
2013 and three years after, it has collapsed. In August 2018, the Ghanaian central bank announced the collapse of 
five banks named as follows: Unibank, Sovereign Bank, Beige Bank, Royal Bank, and Construction Bank. Other 
banks such as GN bank and other financial institutions have also are indicated signs of failure. The phenomenon 
happening in the Ghanaian economy cast doubts on the interest of Ghanaians regarding which banks are safe for 
both depositors and investors to lodge their hard-earned money. Also, workers in the banking sector are worried 
about their Job security as thousands of workers have to lay off at the collapse of the bank. Taking into account 
the frequent mergers, acquisitions, collapse and winding up of Ghanaian banks from 2016 to 2019 with its 
associated capital loss, employment loss, and socially undesirable results, it is important to view bankruptcy 
assessment as rudimentary in the financial sector. This study, therefore, apply Altman [2000] and Taffler [1983] 
Z- scores to examine the financial health of both listed and unlisted commercial banks in Ghana. In addition, 
Beneish [1999] M-score model was equally employed to detect the possibility of earnings manipulations in the 
publicly published annual financials of the understudy banks. The originality of this study is to extend the 
application of Altmann [2000], Tattler [1983] and Beneish [1999] Model on both indigenous and multinational 
Commercial Banks in Ghana which has not been previously carried out in the practice for bank failure 
assessment. This paper thus makes use of the most important and widely accepted accounting-based predictive 
models. To the best of my knowledge, a study of this nature has not been conducted in Ghana specifically in the 
banking sector.  
Altman’s Z model is one of the best- known models, statistically derived predictive model that is used to 
predict a firm’s bankruptcy [Moyer, 2005]. Altman is a very famous financial economist and professor at New 
York’s Stern School of Business developed Altman’s Z score model in [1968]. The Z-Score approved by 
management accountants, auditors, and database systems beginning in the mid-1980s. Although, Edward Altman 
originally developed the Z-Score based on a small sample of manufacturing firms. Altman’s Z-Score formula is a 
multivariate formula that is used to measure the financial health of a company and to predict the probability that a 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.12, No.12, 2020 
 
53 
company will go bankrupt within two years. The Z-Score uses various financial accounting ratios and market-
derived price data to expect bankruptcy. In the early 2000s, Altman modified the model to apply to certain 
situations not originally included in the original sample set. Even though the model is worldwide accepted, 
however, it has its own limitations. Prominent among these is the possibility that secondary data used to estimate 
the independent variables might be manipulated and this manipulation will affect the predictive ability of the model. 
To deal with this limitation, professor Beneish [1999] developed eight indexes for detecting potential earning 
manipulations in the financials published by corporate institutions. This model has been tested by a large number 
of scholars and proved effective in detecting earning manipulations. Following Altman [1968] is professor Taffler 
1983 developed Z-score. Taffler suggested failure model should capture vital corporate solvency and performance 
indicators such as profitability, working capital adequacy, financial risk, and liquidity. To establish the authenticity 
of the result, this paper employed all the above-mentioned Models. 
 
2Theoretical Framework and Literature Review. 
The examination of corporate failure prediction can be categorized into three broad areas: First, developing a 
prediction models and it often provides general index which can be used to measure the possibility of failure, such 
as the study of Zeytunoglu & Akarim (2013); Altman (1968); Christidis & Gregory (2010); Beaver (1966). The 
Second field looks at the assessment of the validity and predictive accuracy of newly developed models such as 
the study of Onyeiwu (2009); Wang & Campbell (2010); Kiyak & Labanauskaite (2012); Mamo (2011) and Soon 
et al. (2014). The third category deals with an applied investigation or studies which aim to tell the bankruptcy 
status of particular firms in a given country like the study of Mohammed & Soon (2012); Kenneth & Adeniyi 
(2014) and Azadinamin (2012). This study assumed the nature of the third category where the Altman revised 
model, Taffler (1983) and Beneish (1999) model is applied to assess the bankruptcy status and financial statement 
fraud of non-failed commercial banks in Ghana. 
 
2.1 Empirical Review 
A number of studies have materialized to explicate corporate bankruptcy and the ability of predictive models in 
successfully predicting their occurrence. This section offers insight into the pieces of literature and models for 
forecasting business insolvency and manipulation of annual financial accounts. 
A study by Altman [1968], identified some financial KPIs – working capital, total assets, earnings and 
retained earnings before interest and tax, the market value of equity, the book value of total debt and sales. These 
KPIs are considered important in comparing companies in a data set of 33 failed and 33 non-failed companies. 
Altman’s five –variable model identified 95 percent of the total sample of companies tested for bankruptcy. This 
percentage rate of success in predicting bankruptcy fell to 72 percent when the data used was obtained two years 
prior to bankruptcy. This study came out with a model that is called (Z-Score) which has received overwhelming 
endorsement across the globe. It also measures the firm’s longevity, liquidity, profitability, leverage, productivity, 
and solvency, leads to best-known conclusions, reliability and avoids judgment bias according to [Sulphey, 2013]. 
Oware, Samanhyia, and Anisom-Yaansah [2016] studied financial bankruptcy and bankruptcy prediction in 
Ghanaian selected listed banks. Using Altman’s Z-score model, they found out that, individually, 80% of the 
selected banks have their average Z-score between 1.1 to 2.6 and are classified in the grey zone. These banks were 
found to be neither financially bankrupt nor classified as safe. On the other hand, 20% of the selected banks have 
been found to be in the bankrupt zone. 
Bhunia et al. [2011] argued that protective measures can be taken if the company is predicted to be proceeding 
in the direction of potential bankruptcy and this can help ease the financial crisis to all stakeholders and minimizes 
the bankruptcy cost. However, they argued that resolve bankruptcy problem may result in a conflict of interest 
between shareholders (who want the company to invest risky but high return projects so that the value of the firm 
will rise) and creditors (who require low-risk projects since it leaves them with a low value). 
Soon et al. [2014] used Altman’s Z score model to predict the financial bankruptcy of 28 firms listed on 
services sector at the stock exchange of Malaysia from 2003 to 2009, and this study concluded that Z score model 
can be used to differentiate between failure companies and non-failure companies, and this model is very useful 
for investors to expect financial failure of any companies. 
Chotalia [2014] examined the financial health of Indian private sector banks using Altman’s Z-score model 
and concluded that banks of the private sector understudy fell in ‘Grey Zone’ as per Z-score criteria and the risk 
of financial bankruptcy was looming on selected banks. 
Zeytınoglu and Akarim [2013] used Altman’s Z-score model to calculate 20 financial ratios to predict the 
bankruptcy of companies and developed the most reliable model by analyzing these ratios statistically. The study 
found capital adequacy and networking capital/ total assets ratios are deemed to be significant ratios in the three 
periods covered [2009 – 2011]. 
Usdin and Bloom [2012] recommended that the use of experts who are independent of the pressures inherent 
in managing a company and are available to analyze and advise a company in any difficult financial situations. 
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Such professionals include Attorneys specializing in advising bankrupt companies, Accountants specializing in 
assisting bankrupt companies and Turnaround specialists. 
Nzewi, Ezejiofor, and Okoye [2014] used Altman’s Z-score model to predict the bankruptcy of Nigerian 
banks. This study concluded that the model was capable of determining truthfully the failure potential of sound 
and healthy banks. Furthermore, this research showed that Altman’s bankruptcy prediction model could have 
successfully predicted the collapse of the banks that eventually suffered a corporate failure in Nigeria. And also 
the study of Adeyemi [2011] identified lack of transparency, inadequate capital huge and non-performing loans as 
accountable for bank failure in Nigeria. In addition, factors such as ownership structure, poor management, and 
weak internal control system may be a cause for failure. 
Al-Khatib and Al-Horani [2012] used Logistic Regression and Discriminant Analysis and made a comparison 
between the two models to determine which is more relevant to be used, as well as which financial ratios are 
statistically significant in expecting the financial bankruptcy of Jordanian companies. 
Jyothi and Veni [2018] conducted a comparative study of financial stability and solvency of four Indian 
private banks using Altman’s Z-score model. The results of this study found that all four selected banks were 
financially robust and far away from bankruptcy. And also this study demonstrated that the Altman’s Z-score value 
of all selected banks lied in Safe Zone since the Z-score was greater than 2.6. 
Forecasting of corporate failure or insolvency has been well exploited using higher-income economic data 
such as the study of [Altman 1968, Taffler 1983, Boritz, Kennedy, &Sun 2007]. Despite the multiplicity of the 
models available, corporations and scholars often make use of Altman [1968] and Taffler [1983] model hand in 
hand to predict business failure. Most of these studies successfully predicted corporate failure using the Altman 
MDA model. However, there are a number of limitations. There has been limited literature from emerging 
economy particularly Ghana whose economy is vulnerable to infrastructural interference. Also, findings from these 
studies failed to provide a suitable model to be used to achieve consistent results in predicting corporate failure. 
This paper, therefore, applies Altman [1968], Taffler [1983], and Beneish's [1999] model to fill this gap by adding 
literature evidence from an emerging economy perspective by statistically assessing the insolvency status of 
commercial banks in Ghana. Altman and Taffler's model is used to determine the bankruptcy status whereas the 
Beneish model is used to examine the accuracy of the annual financial statement published by the understudy 
banks. 
2.2.1 Theoretical Review-Altman’s [2000] Z-Score (Model 1). 
)1122(5998044200310732847017170 ...      X. + X. + X. + X. + X. = ALTMAN (Z)  
This model was developed by Professor Edward Altman in the year 2000. The original Altman Z-score was later 
modified to overcome this shortcoming, and now the Altman Z-score model can be used for both manufacturing 
and non-manufacturing, private companies and for those listed on the emerging markets. The model, for some 
reason, appears to create a lot of mixed emotions; some of these emotions are in favor of it while others are 
against it.  The study of Grice and Ingram [2001] indicated that the accuracy of the Altman Z-score model is 
significantly lower in recent periods than reported in Altman’s study. Most criticisms against this model are its 
over-reliance on accounting data; focus on failure rather than sustainability of the business; inadequate 
recognition of cash-flow as a relevant component; lack of consideration on non-financial ratios; the need for 
industry-specific or geography-specific model types and the danger of flexible interpretation or manipulation of 
financial results resulting in “window dressing” or inappropriate favorable report of financial position [Wilkinson, 
2009]. The first shortcoming of the Altman Z-score model is the need for industry-specific or geography-specific 
model types. Specific industries have different characteristics; hence it would not be suitable to apply a general 
model for all these industries. And this model is the assumption that financial ratios are taken from public financial 
information will be accurate. According to Panneerselvam, [2008]. Firms in financial bankruptcy manipulate 
their financial statements to show good performance. Therefore, errors in these secondary data will influence the 
level of accuracy of the outcomes and will not be suitable for the present purpose. The interpretation of the Z-
score as presented by Professor Altman’s theory indicates that overall Score more than 2.9 represents a zone of 
creditworthiness or financial soundness. However, a score below 1.23 is classified as an insolvency or liquidation 
zone (Failed zone). Finally, the gap between 1.23 and 2.9 is the Zone of Ignorance or uncertainty.  
TotalAsset
italWorkingCap
X 1                                    2122( ... ) 
The working capital is ascertained by subtracting current liabilities from the current asset. This matrix of X1 
is used to estimates the net liquid asset as a ratio of the total book value of identifiable assets. In the ideal situation, 
continuous operating losses can lead to a deterioration of current assets with respect to total Assets. 
TotalAsset
ofitdAccumulate
X
Pr
2                                   )3122( ...      
The matrix X2 measures the firm-level leverage and it embodies the reinvest profit into the asset. The logic 
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behind X2 is that the accumulated profit of a firm is subject or prone to falsifications because of the reorganization 
and disbursement of dividends.  
TotalAsset
ofitOperating
X
Pr
3                                       )4122( ...  
The relation (X3) examines the efficient utilization of assets in creating of worth. A lower ratio is an indication 
of inefficiency in the utilization of the company's assets. The ratio, therefore, produces the cash available for 
creditors settlement, Government and shareholder’s payments. 
 
esfLiabilitiBookValueO
fEquityBookValueO
X 4                                 )5122( ...  
The book value of equity is calculated by adding the book value of ordinary and preference shares whereas 
the book value of total debts is estimated as either the addition of current and non-current debt or the total of long-
term debts. The variable X4 is the reversal of the equity ratio. 
TotalAsset
venueTotal
X
Re
5                                            )6122( ...      
This is the ratio that defines the activity of sales and assets. This ratio is used to assess the ability of asset in 
generating profit or earnings. Though the impact of X5 was underscored by Altman (2000) however, it’s inclusion 
will enhance the predictive ability of the Model.  
2.2.2 Taffler [1983] Z-Score (Model 2). 
Professor Taffler in 1983 suggested in his studies that failure models should reflect certain key variables of 
corporate solvency and performance such as profitability, working capital adequacy, financial risk, and liquidity. 
He thus formulated his Z-score as: 
(2.2.2.1)                             0.16X4+0.18X3+0.13X2+0.53X1 =Z  
Where: 
LiabilityCurrent 
Tax BeforeProfit 
1 X                                       )...( 2222  
LiabilityCurrent 
AssetCurrent 
2 X                                        (2.2.2.3) 
Asset Total
LiabilityCurrent 
3 X                                        (2.2.2.4)   
onDepreciati-Cost Operating
LiabilityCurrent -AssetQuick 
3 X                             (2.2.2.5) 
The weight X1, X2, X3, and X4 in the model are the explanatory variables employed to estimates the explained 
variable (Z- Value) in the model. X1 represents a measure of profitability, X2 is a measure of working capital 
position, X3, on the other hand, is a measure of financial risk and finally, X4 denotes the number of credit intervals. 
The benchmark for Taffler’s model is subjected to Negative (-) and positive (+). A negative (-) score means the 
company has a financial profile similar to the previously failed business. While a positive (+) score indicates the 
company is safe from insolvency risk. 
2.2.3 Beneish 1999 M-Score (Model 3) 
Professor Beneish developed a model called (M-score) in 1999 as a balancing scientific tool to the Altman Z-
score model with the aim of protecting shareholders, creditors, and bankers in their evaluations. Beneish M-score 
model is considered a material tool that is frequently used to detect areas of possible manipulation on the firm’s 
financial statements by accountants, auditors, and regulators (particularly the SEC). The Beneish model evaluates 
the possibility of earnings manipulation and also estimates the extent to which reported earnings to deviate from 
actual. Accounting manipulations include inter alia: reducing liabilities, recording revenue too soon and not 
recognizing current expense appropriately, increment in receivables, declining resource quality, development in 
sales and accruals [Warshavsky, 2012]. This model is used to discriminate between companies that have 
manipulated their annual financials. The score can be determined from eight independent variables and an 
intercept to detect whether the company’s earnings have been manipulated by management. The eight variables 
were taken from the firm’s financial statements and used to determine the M-score of this study.  When an M-
score is greater than -2.22 indicates that the firm’s financial statements may have been manipulated [Warshavsky, 
2012]. Hence, if this score that is obtained from the computation of the eight variables from understudy bank’s 
financials is greater than the cut-off point of negative 2.22, then it concludes that the financial statements were 
manipulated. The score suggests that the financial statements are prepared by management should be examined 
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or have to be investigated further for financial fraud. M-score model is considered as a probability model, and 
such cannot detect 100% manipulation. Beneish concluded that it is possible to determine 76% manipulators 
accurately and 17.5% incorrectly is considered as non-manipulator. According to Beneish et.al.[1999], the indices 
have varying rationales as described below. 
BENEISH(M)=-4.84+(0.92*DRI)+(0.528*GMI)+(0.404*AQI) + (0.892* RGI) +(0.115*DEPI)–(0.172* 
SGAI) +(4.679* TATA)-(0.327 * LVGI)      (2.2.3.1) 
where: 
Day Receivable Index (DRI) 
DRI can be used to measure the variations in respect of receivables consistent with the variations in respect of 
revenue. When a DRI score is 1.031 or below shows that the financial statements in respect of the DRI were not 
manipulated but 1.465 score or above indicates the financial statements have been manipulated in respect of the 
DRI or an indication that, the firm has changed its credit terms and now providing more credit than before. When 
this does not show a fair consistent trend then it suggests that either the majority of revenue is on credit terms 
rather than cash or the company has difficulty in the collection of cash from debtors. A rising DRI may be the 
perfect legal activity of the firm extending more credit to customers and the firms that overstated revenue. 
Therefore, a sharp rise in the DRI score provides signals to auditors that, the financial statements of the firms are 
manipulated or terms of credit have changed. Empirically described as: 
  (2.2.3.2)                           
(PY)(PY)/SALESRECEIVABLE ACCOUNT
(CY)(CY)/SALESRECEIVABLE ACCOUNT
DRI  
Gross Margin Index (GMI) 
GMI also can be used to measure the ratio of a preceding year’s GMI to that of the contemporary year review. 
According to Harrington, [2005], the GMI score of 1.041 or lower suggests gross profit of the current period is not 
manipulated however a score of 1.193 is an indication that gross profit of the firm is manipulated. Financial Analyst 
orated that earning quality is considered a very important aspect for assessing the firm’s financial fitness and 
therefore, can create an avenue for earnings manipulations especially when performance is downgraded. The 
numerical representation is shown below. 
2.2.3.3                                         
Sales(CY)Sales(CY)/ oFCost -Sales(CY)
Sales(PY)Sales(PY)/ oFCost -Sales(PY)
GMI  
Asset Quality Index (AQI) 
AQI is used to measure the percentage of total assets of the current year to the preceding year. According to 
Pustylnick (2009), a ratio greater than 1.0 is a signal that some overheads or intangible assets have been capitalized 
and others have been overdue for the impending year. Harrington 2005, espouse that growth in AQI suggests 
additional expenses have been capitalized to avoid writing-off to the comprehensive income statement in order to 
preserve profit. This can be mathematically presented as follows: 
Asset(Py) talPPE(Py)/To-Asset Total
Asset(cy) talPPE(cy)/To-Asset Total
AQI                                                       (2.2.3.4)             
Revenue Growth Index (RGI) 
RGI is a measure of sales or revenue for the current year over the sales or revenue of the preceding year.  And also 
can be used to measure the revenue figure in the contemporary year. Benchmark value of 1.134 or below forecast 
non-manipulation and a value above 1.607 predicts the possibility of sales or revenue manipulations. Harrington 
[2005] noted that firms with high growth rates find themselves highly motivated to commit fraud when the trends 
reverse. Below is the mathematical representation; 
)Revenue(py
)Revenue(cy
RGI                                                                                                      (2.2.3.5)                                                                      
Depreciation Index (DEPI) 
DEPI is used to measure the ratio of the depreciation expense against the firm’s value of PPE in the current year 
against that of the preceding year. DEPI ratio of 1.001 or lower is an indication of DEPI manipulations. However, 
a score above 1.077 indicates the value of the assets has been revalued or the useful life of the assets has been 
adjusted upward [Beneish, 1999]. The ratio is described as follows: 
PPE(py)+exp ciation.(py)/Depre exp on.Depreciati
PPE(cy)+exp ciation.(cy)/Depre exp on.Depreciati
DEPI                      (2.2.3.6)   
Sales, General, and Administrative Expenses Index (SGAI) 
SGAI is the ratio of sales, general and administrative expenses for the current year over the preceding year.  When 
a score of 1.001 or below is obtained, it indicates that SGAI has not been manipulated. According to Thiagarajan 
and Lev. [1993], a disproportional increase in SGAI is considered as an indicator of a negative signal about the 
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firm’s upcoming prospects. A positive relation gives an indication of possible manipulations. 
(py) )/Sales(py Cost  tiveAdministra and GeneralSales,
(cy) )/Sales(cy Cost  tiveAdministra and GeneralSales,
SGAI                       (2.2.3.7) 
Leverage Index (LEVI) 
LEVI can be used to measure the firm’s ratio in terms of total debt to total assets for the current year is divided 
over the preceding year’s ratio. When a LEVI is greater than 1 indicates that there is an increase in leverage 
position in the firm and that the firm has taken more debt to operate or to run the business for the period under 
review. Empirically;    
TotalAsset
lityTotalLiabi
LEVI                                                                                                    (2.2.3.8)                                                                             
Total Accruals to Total Assets Index (TATAI)  
TATAI is the ratio of change in working capital other than cash and less depreciation. The increase in TATAI may 
indicate that goodwill and amortization numbers in the financial statements of the company have been tampered 
with.  When a mean score is 0.018 indicates that there are non-financial manipulations in respect of TATAI while 
a mean score of 0.031 and above is an indicator that the financial data have been tampered with. Mathematically 
presented as: 
TotalAsset
onDepreciati-Capital Working
TATAI                                                              (2.2.3.9)                                                          
 
3.0 Methodology 
3.1 sample and Research Method 
The study uses numerical investigation on the dataset extracted from the financial position, and comprehensive 
income statement of quoted and Unquoted commercial banks situated in Ghana. The financial statements were 
taken from the website of the companies, Ghana Stock Exchange(GSE) and Annual Report Ghana. The study 
sampled a total of 19 commercial banks within the categories of multinational and local banks based on the 
availability of up to date financial statements on the above-mentioned websites. The time spinning from 2015 to 
2018 was the period covered by the study and it is considered long enough to detect any financial or insolvency 
risk. The selection of the banking sector was purposively considered by the authors due to the current instability 
and inefficiency in the Ghanaian banking sector. The study adopted three (3) models for the detection of potential 
bankruptcy signs and earnings manipulations. Altman [2000] Z-Score and Taffler [1983] Z-Score model was 
applied for the detection and establishment of the financial soundness of the banks under review. The Beneish M-
Score model was employed to investigates the possibility of earnings Manipulations for the understudy years. The 
investigative tools adopted for this study include excel for the computations of variables, Z-Scores, and M-score 
and Eviews version ten for descriptive and correlation analysis. 
 
3.2 Hypotheses.  
Considering the recent occurrences of mergers and acquisitions, liquidation and closure of some prominent 
commercial banks in Ghana between 2016 and 2019 such as UT bank, UniBank, Construction bank, Beige bank, 
Royal Bank, Capital Bank, as well as the proposed merger and acquisition deal between Energy Bank and First 
National bank (BOG annual report 2018) indicated that the Ghanaian Banking sector is experiencing credit crunch. 
Also taking into account the recent minimum capital requirement set by the Bank of Ghana (BOG) which every 
registered Commercial Bank is required to meet as of 2018 is likely to motivate some banks to manipulate their 
earning to fake their true performance. This assumption is supported by the study of Macarthy [2017], Gyarteng 
[2014], and Beneish [1999] which concluded that financial ratios taken from public financial information will not 
be accurate considering the fact that firms with financial distress manipulate their financials to show healthier 
performance as in the case of Enron Corporation. Consequently, manipulations in these financial data will affect 
the level of accuracy of the outcomes and will not be appropriate for the failure prediction [Panneerselvam, 2008]. 
Therefore, this study seeks to test the following hypotheses: 
H1.  The more financially troubled commercial banks have the lowest Z-Score ratio using both Altman and Taffler 
models for the years under review. 
H2. The understudied banks that are less financially troubled have the highest Z-Score ratio under the study period 
using the Altman and Taffler model. 
H3: The annual financial statements published by the commercial banks is likely to exhibit signs of manipulations 
to show better performance. 
H4: The annual financial statements published by the commercial banks were not manipulated to show better 
performance. 
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of financial ratios (independents variables) computed using the four-year annual financial 
statements for all the models are summarized in table1. Similarly, the descriptive statistics of 19 commercial banks 
that were computed by means of Altman Z-Score, Taffler Z-score, and Beneish M-score models are displayed in 
tables 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Table 1 is divided into three namely, Altman, Taffler and Beneish model.   
From table 1: The highest mean of financial ratio (3.170) in the case of Altman was recorded by Sales/Total 
asset (x5) with a corresponding maximum value of 8.970 for a total sample of 19 banks and this is consistent with 
the result of Sulub, S. A. [2014]. This result indicates that the ability of asset in generating earnings is promising 
among the 19 selected banks. However, the firm-level leverage matrix (x2) recorded the lowest mean score (0.041) 
with a maximum value of (0.682) for all understudy banks. In the case of the Taffler model, the number of 
credit/defense intervals (x4) recorded the highest mean score of 2.565 with a maximum mean of 11.741. This 
implies the commercial banks on average can meet their expenses for approximately 3 years if it is unable to record 
revenue. This is followed by the working capital ratio (x2), financial risk ratio (x3) and lastly profitability ratio 
with a mean value of 0.233. Beneish model, on the other hand, recorded the highest variable mean score value of 
3.493 with a maximum of 144.348 and this score is attributed to General and administration expenses index (SGAI). 
This depicts a high probability of SGAI manipulation followed by DEPI, and TATAI with a mean of 1.297 and 
0.170 respectively. According to Balmer M. G Principles of statistics, a distribution is said to be normal if the 
value of the skewness and kurtosis are respectively 0 and 3. From Table 1, it can be seen that the value of skewness 
and kurtosis of the variables indicates a Leptokurtic distribution.   
From Table 2 it can be observed from the Altman model that the mean Z-score of the 19 commercial banks 
chronicled a maximum value of 9.4630 in 2018 and a minimum value of 0.9002 in 2015. With the exception of 
the year 2018, the mean Z-score recorded the least value of 3.2095 in 2015 and this observation could possibly 
mean the commercial banks were financially not healthy in the year 2015 as compared to the remaining years 
under review.   
The Taffler Z-Scores as presented in table 3 chronicled a maximum Z-score of 4.000 in 2016 and a minimum 
of -0.9780 in 2018. Similar to observation in Altman result, the mean z- score recorded the least value 0.7841 in 
2015 followed by 2017 then 2016 and the highest mean were recorded in 2018 and this result may indicate a sign 
of financial distressed among the commercial banks in the year 2015 according to Taffler Z- scores and this 
observation is consistent with that of Altman model (see table 2 above). In the case of Beneish M-score (see table 
4), reported a maximum mean M-Score of 24.6450 in 2015 and a minimum of -37.4360 in 2015. However, the 
mean M-Score registered a peak value of -0.6659 in 2018 and the lowest value of -2.6604 in 2015. This result 
showcases a clear incident of higher earnings manipulations in 2018 among the sampled commercial banks.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for 19 sampled Banks using the annual financial report for the period of 4 
years to 2018. 
ALTMAN AND TAFFLER MODEL 1&2 (2015-2018) 
STATISTICS X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 
 Mean 0.176 0.041** 0.126 0.241 3.170* 
 Median 0.175 0.024 0.042 0.168 2.719 
 Maximum 0.803 0.682** 1.750 2.041 8.972* 
 Minimum (0.491) (0.152) (0.105) 0.026 0.704 
 Std. Dev. 0.206 0.116 0.278 0.295 1.933 
 Skewness 0.049 4.384 3.699 4.325 1.081 
 Kurtosis 5.553 25.221 18.641 23.281 3.839 
M ALYYYYYGTMAN MODEL ODEL (2)2015-2018 
STATISTICS X1 X2 X3 X4 
 Mean 0.232 1.377 0.715 2.565* 
 Median 0.054 1.103 0.788 2.206 
 Maximum 3.813 14.561 0.901 11.741* 
 Minimum (0.316) 0.216 0.015 (10.114) 
 Std. Dev. 0.562 1.955 0.217 3.717 
 Skewness 4.193 5.814 (2.137) (0.384) 
 Kurtosis 24.361 36.599 6.504 5.909 
BENEISH MODEL (3) 
STATISTICS DSRI GMI AQI SGI DEPI SGAI TATAI LEVI 
 Mean 1.452 0.916 1.014 1.433 1.297 3.493 0.170 0.888 
 Median 0.981 1.000 1.000 1.187 1.083 0.998 0.171 0.857 
 Maximum 9.473 3.437 2.022 6.384 12.321 144.348 0.795 3.579 
Minimum 0 (9.006) 0.933 0.007 0 0.001 (0.494) 0.067 
 Std. Dev. 1.758 1.210 0.125 1.086 1.445 16.711 0.204 0.432 
 Skewness 3.182 (7.250) 7.282 2.801 6.159 8.081 0.022 4.367 
 Kurtosis 13.515 61.294 58.283 11.431 46.273 68.275 5.563 26.720 
Source: Financial Reports (2015 – 2018) 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics (Z-SCORES Model 1) 
 ALTMAN (2000) Z-SCORE,  N=19 
 MEAN MEDIAN MINIMUM MAXIMUM Std.Dev. SKEWNESS KURTOSIS 
2015 3.2095 2.5500 0.9002 8.5750 2.1218 1.1847 3.5121 
2016 3.5711 3.6940 1.6580 5.9580 1.3178 0.2544 1.9925 
2017 3.9850 3.5220 1.8460 8.8100 1.7302 1.2180 4.3047 
2018  4.4927  3.9010 2.2930 9.4630 1.9235 1.2759 3.7836 
Source: Financial Reports (2015 – 2018) 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics (Taffler Z-Scores, Model 2). 
 TAFFLER (1983) Z-SCORE,  N=19 
 MEAN MEDIAN MINIMUM MAXIMUM Std.Dev. SKEWNESS KURTOSIS 
2015 0.7841 0.6380 (0.7060) 2.3820 0.7174 0.5561 3.4114 
2016 0.8637 0.6250 (0.2700) 4.0000 0.8982 2.3994 9.0535 
2017 0.7849 0.7530 (0.9060) 2.1910 0.6399 (0.1649) 4.8765 
2018 0.9311 0.8560 (0.9780) 2.2840 0.6623 (0.7521) 5.4296 
Source: Source: Financial Reports (2015 – 2018) 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics (Beneish M-Score, Model 3). 
 BENEISH (1999) M-SCORE,  N=19 
 MEAN MEDIAN MINIMUM MAXIMUM Std.Dev. SKEWNESS KURTOSIS 
2015 (2.6604) (1.4820) (37.4360) 24.6450 12.1550 (0.9072) 5.8184 
2016 (1.6002) (1.4520) (8.1380) 1.3150 2.3771 (1.5177) 4.9545 
2017 (1.3609) (1.5890) (12.1620) 10.7190 4.1161 0.5014 7.2876 
2018 (0.6659) (1.0410) (5.5080) 7.1720 2.6207 1.0557 5.8786 
Source: Financial Reports (2015 – 2018) 
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4.2 Correlation Matrix analysis. 
4.2.1 Correlation of the independent variables to the Z-Scores 
The correlation of the independent variables to the Z-Scores basically advocates what variables or ratios are the 
main drivers of the Z-score. Therefore, knowing the main drivers of the Z-score, organizations can enhance those 
ratios or variables to effect the better performance of the organization. The Altman Model (table 5) showed a 
strong correlation between X5 and Z- Score, signifying that a high asset turnover ratio was a significant driver in 
the survival of the business. Except for working capital/Total asset (x1) which showed a negative correlation with 
the Z-Score, the remaining ratios x2, x3, and x4 indicated a weak positive correlation with the Z-Score (see table 
20 below). With regards to Taffler’s model, credit or defense interval (x4) registered a strong positive correlation 
with the Z-Score indicating that credit interval is the major determinant of business survival. However, with the 
exception of the financial risk ratio (x3), the remaining ratios (profitability and working capital position) indicated 
a weak positive correlation with the Z-Score (see table 6).  
To conclude, there was a significant correlation between all the variables and the Z-Scores in both Altman 
and Taffler model, whilst there was a strong correlation between credit interval ratio and Z-Score in Taffler’s 
model and asset turnover ratio and the Z-score in the case of Altman model. 
Table 5: Correlation matrix between the independent variables and the Z-scores (Altman-Model) 
 X1 X2 X3 X5 X4 ZSCORE 
 
X1 
1.0000 
 
0.1719 (0.2150) (0.0340) (0.0899) (0.0168) 
 
X2 
 
0.1719 
1.0000 
 
0.0225 (0.0389) 0.0892 0.0267 
 
X3 
 
(0.2150) 
 
0.0225 
1.0000 
 
(0.2954) (0.0256) 0.1314 
 
X5 
 
(0.0340) 
 
(0.0389) 
 
(0.2954) 
 
1.0000 
0.1005 0.8997 
 
X4 
 
(0.0899) 
 
0.0892 
 
(0.0256) 
 
0.1005 
 
1.0000 
0.0872 
 
Z-SCORE 
 
(0.0168) 
 
0.0267 
 
0.1314 
 
0.8997 
 
0.0872 
 
1.0000 
Source: Financial Reports (2015 – 2018) 
 
Table 6: Correlation matrix between the independent variables and the Z-scores (Taffler-Model 2) 
 X1 X2 X3 X4 ZSCORE 
 
X1 
 
1.0000 
 
 
(0.1086) 
 
(0.3336) 
 
0.1430 
 
0.4727 
X2 (0.1086) 1.0000 0.0846 0.0262 0.3323 
 
X3 
 
(0.3336) 
 
0.0846 
 
1.0000 
 
(0.4328) 
 
(0.4091) 
 
X4 
 
0.1430 
 
0.0262 
 
(0.4328) 
 
1.0000 
 
0.8658 
 
Z-SCORE 
 
0.4727 
 
0.3323 
 
(0.4091) 
 
0.8658 
 
1.0000 
Source: Financial Reports (2015 – 2018) 
4.2.2 Correlation matrix of the Z-scores (Altman and Taffler) to Beneish M-Score 
The logic of knowing the correlation between Z-Scores and Beneish M-Score will go a long way to assist scholars 
and management in decision making. To scholars, it will give reasons for the need to use both models in Corporate 
failure predicting studies. Management, shareholders, auditors, and investors on the other hand' will appreciate the 
importance of using Altman and Taffler’s model to assess the performance of corporate entities. As reported in 
Table 21 below, it can be observed that there is a strong positive correlation between Beneish M-Score and all the 
Z-Scores models employed in this study (Altman 2000 and Taffler 1983 model). Note, the fact there is such a 
strong and positive correlation between the models serves as a reasonability check, as an increase in M-Score 
advocate possibility of earning manipulations. Hence, a positive correlation suggests that the banks under review 
tend to manipulate their financial statements to showcases a good performance. Therefore, as the banks manipulate 
their earnings (upwards M-Score), Altman and Taffler’s Z-Scores improve from distress to safe zone. Also, the 
negative correlation between Taffler and Altman Z-Scores indicates that as the banks obtained better Z-Score in 
Taffler’s model, their score in the Altman model tends to be worsening and this accounted for the differences in 
their predictive accuracy (see table 7).    
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Table 7: Correlation matrix of the Z-scores (Altman and Taffler) to Beneish M-Score 
 TAFFLER Z-SCORE ALTMAN Z-SCORE BENEISH M-SCORE 
TAFFLER Z-SCORE 1.0000 (0.1777) 0.7365 
ALTMAN Z-SCORE (0.1777) 1.0000 0.4479 
BENEISH M-SCORE 0.7365 0.4479 1.0000 
                         Source: Financial Reports (2015 – 2018) 
 
4.3 Presentation and Assessments of Z-Scores. 
Investigating the annual financials using Altman and Taffler Z-Scores provides justifications for appreciating and 
appraising the fallouts of business processes and illuminates how well the industry has performed. In this regard, 
Altman and Taffler’s Z-Scores were employed to examine the bankruptcy status of 19 commercial banks in Ghana 
and the outcome is presented below. 
Table 8: Results of Z-Score using Altman's (2000) Model (N=19) 
BANK CODE 2015 2016 2017 2018 AVERAGE 
 Z-SCORE Z-SCORE Z-SCORE Z-SCORE Z-SCORE 
ABG 3.348 3.927 4.459 5.628 4.058 
ADB 2.564 2.345 2.510 6.731 3.405 
BAB 8.575 5.470 5.413 3.519 6.739 
BOA 2.046 4.656 4.946 3.901 4.084 
CALL 3.022 2.290 3.322 3.304 3.091 
EGH 5.619 5.958 8.810 8.193 6.559 
FAB 1.431 4.947 6.788 3.025 3.736 
FBL 4.117 3.694 3.100 2.794 3.608 
FNB 2.156 1.658 2.756 2.293 2.000 
GCB 2.414 3.216 2.256 3.091 2.749 
GTB 5.407 4.075 3.522 9.463 5.613 
RBG 1.229 3.862 4.873 4.670 3.263 
SBG 1.643 2.147 4.554 4.324 2.948 
SCB 7.167 5.551 4.278 4.007 5.389 
SOGEGH 1.690 1.678 2.821 3.185 2.305 
TBL 1.311 2.603 2.583 3.885 2.361 
UBA 3.792 2.924 4.376 6.054 4.572 
UMB 0.900 3.947 1.846 4.390 3.261 
ZTB 2.550 2.902 2.502 2.903 2.253 
Source: Financial Reports (2015 – 2018). 
 
Table 9: Results of Z-Score using Taffler (1983) Z-Score Model (N=19) 
BANK CODE 2015 2016 2017 2018 AVERAGE 
 Z-SCORE Z-SCORE Z-SCORE Z-SCORE Z-SCORE 
ABG 2.045 0.589 0.589 1.916 2.284 
ADB 1.744 1.867 0.665 0.788 1.886 
BAB 0.698 0.603 0.772 0.879 0.856 
BOA 1.056 1.868 0.531 0.779 0.853 
CALL 1.395 0.753 0.472 0.667 0.752 
EGH 0.418 0.432 0.568 0.523 0.609 
FAB 1.329 0.097 0.489 0.358 0.642 
FBL 0.875 0.680 0.561 0.753 1.143 
FNB 2.594 0.666 0.796 0.552 1.217 
GCB 0.664 0.674 0.701 0.699 0.595 
GTB 1.505 1.746 1.731 2.191 1.402 
RBG 0.795 0.501 0.328 0.513 0.774 
SBG 0.591 0.603 0.701 1.192 1.087 
SCB 0.856 0.756 1.051 1.020 1.052 
SOGEGH 0.781 0.638 0.625 0.536 0.740 
TBL 0.310 0.229 0.204 0.220 0.238 
UBA 0.710 (0.706) 4.000 1.223 1.332 
UMB 1.114 2.382 1.897 1.010 1.207 
ZTB 1.481 0.520 (0.270) (0.906) (0.978) 
Source: Financial Reports (2015 – 2018).  
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Table 10: Assessment of Banks correctly classified as creditworthiness using Altman z-Scores on a yearly 
basis. 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 
BANK 
CODE 
Z-
SCORE 
BANK 
CODE 
Z-
SCORE 
BANK 
CODE 
Z-
SCORE 
BANK 
CODE 
Z-
SCORE 
ABG 3.348 ABG 3.927 UBA 4.376 ABG 5.628 
BAB 8.575 BAB 5.470 SCB 4.278 ADB 6.731 
CALL 3.022 BOA 4.656 SBG 4.554 BAB 3.519 
EGH 5.619 EGH 5.958 RBG 4.873 BOA 3.901 
FBL 4.117 FAB 4.947 GTB 3.522 CALL 3.304 
GTB 5.407 FBL 3.694 FBL 3.100 EGH 8.193 
SCB 7.167 GCB 3.216 FAB 6.788 FAB 3.025 
UBA 3.792 GTB 4.075 EGH 8.810 GCB 3.091 
  RBG 3.862 CALL 3.322 GTB 9.463 
SCB 5.551 BOA 3.322 RBG 4.670 
UBA 2.924 BAB 5.413 SBG 4.324 
UMB 3.947 ABG 4.459 SCB 4.007 
ZTB 2.902  SOGEGH 3.185 
 TBL 3.885 
UBA 6.054 
UMB 4.390 
ZTB 2.903 
Total Banks 8 13 12 17 
Percentage % 42% 68% 63% 89% 
                           Source: Financial Reports (2015 – 2018). 
 
Table 11: Assessment of Non-Failed Banks classified as failed by Altman Z-score (Type II Error), N=19 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 
 BANK 
CODE 
Z-
SCORE 
BANK 
CODE 
Z-
SCORE 
BANK 
CODE 
Z-
SCORE 
BANK 
CODE 
 
Z-SCORE 
UMB 0.900 NILL NILL NILL NILL NILL NILL 
Total 1 NILL NILL NILL 
Percentage % 5% NILL NILL NILL 
Source: Financial Reports (2015 – 2018). 
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Table 12: Assessment of Banks correctly classified as creditworthiness using Taffler’s z-Scores on a yearly 
basis. 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 
BANK 
CODE 
Z-
SCOR
E 
BANK 
CODE 
Z-
SCOR
E 
BANK 
CODE 
Z-
SCOR
E 
BANK 
CODE 
Z-
SCOR
E 
ABG 2.045 ABG 0.589 ABG 0.589 ABG 1.916 
ADB 1.744 ADB 1.867 ADB 0.665 ADB 0.788 
BAB 0.698 BAB 0.603 BAB 0.772 BAB 0.879 
BOA 1.056 BOA 1.868 BOA 0.531 BOA 0.779 
CALL 1.395 CALL 0.753 CALL 0.472 CALL 0.667 
EGH 0.418 EGH 0.432 EGH 0.568 EGH 0.523 
FAB 1.329 FAB 0.097 FAB 0.489 FAB 0.358 
FBL 0.875 FBL 0.680 FBL 0.561 FBL 0.753 
FNB 2.594 FNB 0.666 FNB 0.796 FNB 0.552 
GCB 0.664 GCB 0.674 GCB 0.701 GCB 0.699 
GTB 1.505 GTB 1.746 GTB 1.731 GTB 2.191 
RBG 0.795 RBG 0.501 RBG 0.328 RBG 0.513 
SBG 0.591 SBG 0.603 SBG 0.701 SBG 1.192 
SCB 0.856 SCB 0.756 SCB 1.051 SCB 1.020 
SOGEG
H 
0.781 SOGEG
H 
0.638 SOGEG
H 
0.625 SOGEG
H 
0.536 
TBL 0.310 TBL 0.229 TBL 0.204 TBL 0.220 
UBA 0.710 UMB 2.382 UBA 4.000 UBA 1.223 
UMB 1.114 ZTB 0.520 UMB 1.897 UMB 1.010 
ZTB 1.481       
Total Banks 19 18 18 18 
Percentage 
% 
100% 95% 95% 95% 
           Source: Financial Reports (2015 – 2018).  
 
Table 13: Assessment of Non-Failed Banks classified as failed (Taffler), N=19 BANKS. 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 
 Bank 
Code 
 
Z-Score 
Bank 
Code 
 
Z-Score 
Bank 
Code 
 
Z-Score 
Bank 
Code 
 
Z-Score 
NILL - UBA (0.706) ZTB (0.270) ZTB (0.906) 
Total Banks NILL 1 1 1 
Percentage % NILL 5% 5% 5% 
Source: Financial Reports (2015 – 2018). 
 
Table 14: Assessment of Banks correctly classified using Average Z-Scores (Altman model) 
 Bank Code Average Z-Score      Bank Status 
ABG 4.058 Quoted 
ADB 3.405 Quoted 
BAB 6.739 Unquoted 
BOA 4.084 Unquoted 
CALL 3.091 Quoted 
EGH 6.559 Quoted 
FAB 3.736 Unquoted 
FBL 3.608 Unquoted 
GTB 5.613 Unquoted 
RBG 3.263 Quoted 
SBG 2.948 Unquoted 
SCB 5.389 Quoted 
UBA 4.572 Unquoted 
UMB 3.261 Unquoted 
 
TOTAL BANKS 
 
14 
 
Source: Financial Reports (2015 – 2018). 
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Table 15: Assessment of Banks correctly classified using Average Z-Scores (Taffler model 2) 
 Bank Code Average Z-Score     Bank Status 
ABG 2.284 Quoted 
ADB 1.886 Quoted 
BAB 0.856 Unquoted 
BOA 0.853 Unquoted 
CALL 0.752 Quoted 
EGH 0.609 Quoted 
FAB 0.642 Unquoted 
FBL 1.143 Unquoted 
FNB 1.217 Unquoted 
GCB 0.595 Quoted 
GTB 1.402 Unquoted 
RBG 0.774 Quoted 
SBG 1.087 Unquoted 
SCB 1.052 Unquoted 
 SOGEGH 0.740 Quoted 
 TBL 0.238 Quoted 
 UBA 1.332 Unquoted 
 UMB 1.207 Unquoted 
 
TOTAL BANKS 
 
18 
 
 
PERCENTAGE % 
 
95% 
 
               Source: Financial Reports (2015 – 2018). 
 
Table 16: Assessments of Banks classified into Grey zone using Altman z-Scores (Model 1) on a yearly 
basis. 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Bank 
Code 
 
Z-Score 
Bank 
Code 
 
Z-Score 
Bank 
Code 
 
Z-Score 
Bank 
Code 
 
Z-Score 
ADB 2.564 ADB 2.345 ZTB 2.502 FBL 2.794 
BOA 2.046 CALL 2.290 UMB 1.846 FNB 2.293 
FAB 1.431 FNB 1.658 TBL 2.583   
FNB 2.156 SBG 2.147 SOGEGH 2.821   
GCB 2.414 SOGEGH 1.678 GCB 2.256   
RBG 1.229 TBL 2.603 FNB 2.756   
SBG 1.643   ADB 2.510   
SOGEGH 1.690       
      TBL 1.311       
ZTB 2.550       
Total Banks 10 6 7 2 
Percentage % 53% 32% 37% 11% 
                    Source: Financial Reports (2015 – 2018) 
 
Table17: Assessments of Banks classified into Grey zone using average Altman z-Scores (Model 1) 
 Bank Code Average Z-Score Bank Status 
FNB 2.000 Unquoted  
GCB 2.749 Quoted 
SOGEGH 2.305 Quoted 
TBL 2.361 Quoted 
ZTB 2.253 Unquoted 
 
Total Banks 
 
5 
 
 
Percentage % 
 
26% 
 
Source: Financial Reports (2015 – 2018). 
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4.4 Presentation and Assessments of M-Scores 
Scrutinizing the annual financials using the Beneish model provides reasons for appreciating and assessing whether 
the annual financials used in evaluating hypothesis 1 was manipulated. To achieved these, the Beneish M-Score 
model was employed to establish whether the annual statements were manipulated and the output is presented in 
table 18, 19 &20. 
Table 18: Results of M-Score using Beneish (1999) Model. (N=19) 
Bank Code 2015 2016 2017 2018 Average 
 M-Score M-Score M-Score M-Score M-Score 
ABG 5.854 (0.141) 0.132 0.176 1.505 
ADB (1.482) (2.110) (1.771) 1.307 (1.014) 
BAB (1.699) (1.452) (1.387) (1.581) (1.530) 
BOA 4.317 (1.882) (1.103) (0.968) 0.091 
CALL (1.501) (1.935) (1.599) (1.500) (1.634) 
EGH (2.129) 0.174 (2.760) (1.804) (1.630) 
FAB (2.532) 0.733 (1.811) (0.305) (0.979) 
FBL 4.337 (1.788) (1.752) (0.507) 0.073 
FNB (20.694) 0.546 3.774 2.454 (3.480) 
GCB (1.331) (1.026) (1.358) (1.449) (1.291) 
GTB (1.468) (1.103) (1.282) (0.396) (1.062) 
RBG (1.671) (0.336) (2.002) (1.120) (1.282) 
SBG 0.258 0.201 (1.438) (1.436) (0.604) 
SCB 24.645 (8.138) (12.162) (5.508) (0.291) 
SOGEGH 0.323 (1.539) (1.188) (1.041) (0.861) 
TBL (15.971) (2.039) (3.267) 0.494 (5.196) 
UBA (37.436) 1.315 10.719 7.172 (4.557) 
UMB (0.177) (6.770) (1.589) (1.859) (2.599) 
ZTB (2.191) (3.113) (4.013) (4.782) (3.525) 
Source: Financial Reports (2015 – 2018). 
 
Table 19: Assessments of Banks M-Score values under manipulation and non-manipulation based on 
yearly score. (Model 3, 2015-2018). 
Code 2015 2016 2017 2018 
 M-
Score 
Zone Of 
Discrimination 
  M- 
Score 
Zone Of 
Discrimination 
M-
Score 
Zone Of 
Discrimination 
  M- 
 Score 
Zone Of 
Discrimination 
ABG 5.854 Manipulation (0.14) Manipulation 0.132 Manipulation 0.176 Manipulation 
ADB (1.482) Manipulation (2.11) Manipulation (1.771) Manipulation 1.307 Manipulation 
BAB (1.699) Manipulation (1.45) Manipulation (1.387) Manipulation (1.58) Manipulation 
BOA 4.317 Manipulation (1.88) Manipulation (1.103) Manipulation (0.96) Manipulation 
CALL (1.501) Manipulation (1.93) Manipulation (1.599) Manipulation (1.50) Manipulation 
 
EGH 
 
(2.129) 
 
Manipulation 
 
0.174 
 
Manipulation 
 
(2.760) 
Non- 
manipulation 
 
(1.80) 
 
Manipulation 
 
FAB 
 
(2.532) 
Non-manipulation  
0.733 
 
Manipulation 
 
 (1.811) 
 
Manipulation 
 
(0.30) 
 
Manipulation 
FBL 4.337 Manipulation (1.78) Manipulation (1.752) Manipulation (0.50) Manipulation 
 
FNB 
 
(20.694) 
Non-manipulation  
0.546 
 
Manipulation 
 
3.774 
No- 
manipulation 
 
2.454 
No- 
manipulation 
GCB (1.331) Manipulation (1.02) Manipulation (1.358) Manipulation (1.44) Manipulation 
GTB (1.468) Manipulation (1.10) Manipulation (1.282) Manipulation (0.39) Manipulation 
RBG (1.671) Manipulation (0.33) Manipulation (2.002) Manipulation (1.12) Manipulation 
SBG 0.258 Manipulation 0.201 Manipulation (1.438) Manipulation (1.43) Manipulation 
 
SCB 
 
24.645 
 
Manipulation 
 
(8.13) 
Non-
Manipulation 
 
(12.16) 
Non- 
manipulation 
 
 (5.50) 
Non- 
manipulation 
SOGEG  
0.323 
 
Manipulation 
 
(1.53) 
 
Manipulation 
 
(1.188) 
 
Manipulation 
 
(1.04) 
 
Manipulation 
TBL  
(15.97) 
Non-manipulation  
(2.03) 
 
Manipulation 
 
(3.267) 
Non- 
manipulation 
 
0.494 
 
Manipulation 
 
UBA 
 
(37.43) 
Non-manipulation  
1.315 
 
Manipulation 
 
10.719 
 
Manipulation 
 
7.172 
 
Manipulation 
 
 UMB 
 
(0.177) 
 
Manipulation 
 
(6.77) 
Non-
Manipulation 
 
(1.589) 
 
Manipulation 
 
(1.85) 
 
Manipulation 
 
ZTB 
 
(2.191) 
 
Manipulation 
 
(3.11) 
Non- 
manipulation 
 
(4.013) 
Non- 
manipulation 
 
(4.78) 
Non- 
manipulation 
Source: Financial Reports (2015 – 2018). 
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Table 20: Assessments of Banks M-Score values based on Average M-scores (Model 3), 2015-2018 
Bank Code Average M-Score Zone Of Discrimination Banks Status 
ABG 1.505 Manipulation Quoted 
ADB (1.014) Manipulation Quoted 
BAB (1.530) Manipulation Unquoted 
BOA 0.091 Manipulation Unquoted 
CALL (1.634) Manipulation Quoted 
EGH (1.630) Manipulation Quoted 
FAB (0.979) Manipulation Unquoted 
FBL 0.073 Manipulation Unquoted 
FNB (3.480) Non- Manipulation Unquoted 
GCB (1.291) Manipulation Quoted 
GTB (1.062) Manipulation Unquoted 
RBG (1.282) Manipulation Quoted 
SBG (0.604) Manipulation Unquoted 
SCB (0.291) Manipulation Quoted 
SOGEGH (0.861) Manipulation Quoted 
TBL (5.196) Non- Manipulation Quoted 
UBA (4.557) Non- Manipulation Unquoted 
UMB (2.599) Manipulation Unquoted 
ZTB (3.525) Non- Manipulation Unquoted 
Source: Financial Reports (2015 – 2018). 
 
4.5 Discussion of Results 
Tables 8 and 9 show the results of Z-Scores computed from the secondary data collected from 2015 to 2018. 
Altman Z-Score computation reported that on average 74% of the banks showed an impressive Z-Score 
performance of being financially sound (see table 14). In the case of a year-on-year score, the result showed a 
progressive Z-Score performance ranging from 63% to 89% of the banks classified as safe from distressed for the 
period of three years except 2015 which recorded 42% (see also table 10). Also, the result classified 53%, 32%, 
37%, and 11% not financially distressed but in the zone of distress or Grey Zone in the year 2015 through 2018 
respectively (see also table 16). Note, it is important to report that the model misclassified (Type II error) one bank 
in the year 2015 representing 5% (see table 11). In general, the model correctly classified 74% of the banks as 
safe and classified 26% of the banks into the grey zone on average. This result is consistent with the result of Soon 
et.al (2014), Ezejiofor (2014), and Jyothi and Veni (2018). 
Taffler Z-Score computation, on the other hand, revealed that on average 95% of the banks showed 
remarkable Z-Score performance of being safe from bankruptcy (see table 15). Using a year-on-year score to 
determine distress revealed an impressive Z-Score performance of 95% of the banks classified as safe from 
distressed through 2016 to 2018 except 2015 which recorded 100% of the banks as healthy (see table 12). However, 
the model misclassified one non-failed bank as failed for the period 2016 to 2018 representing (5%) error rate (see 
table 13). The result of the two models indicates that the commercial banks selected for the study are less 
financially distressed hence H2   hypothesis is supported.  
Tables 18, 19, and 20 reports the result and assessments of m-score calculated from the financial data of 19 
commercial banks spinning from 2015 to 2018. A carefully look at Tables 18 and 19 revealed that financial 
statements of eleven banks (58%) showed signs of possible manipulations as far back 2015 to 2018 as their M-
Score figure is above the benchmark score for non- manipulated earning figures of negative 2.22. The remaining 
eight banks showed signs of manipulation for only three-years score representing (42%). None of the banks were 
found to be free from financial statement fraud in all the four-years study period.  The four-year average M-Score 
in table 20 revealed 79 percent of the banks engaging in earnings manipulation as their average M-Score lies above 
the benchmark figure of negative 2.22.  
Therefore, a detailed overview of the results in table 18 as confirmed by Tables 19 and 20 revealed that 
earnings of all the banks under review were manipulated. This implies that the four-year financial statements were 
manipulated to hide the true financial position of the banks hence the predictive accuracy rate of Altman and 
Taffler model may not reflect the true picture of the models, therefore H3 hypothesis is supported. This result is 
similar to that of McCarthy, J. [2017] which reported that the financial statements for the five years studied were 
manipulated by the management of Enron corporation to hide the true picture of the company’s distress status. 
Contrary to these findings is Amoa-Gyarteng, K. [2014] which analyzed a listed firm in Ghana for early warning 
signs of bankruptcy and financial statement fraud with the Beneish model. His findings revealed that the companies 
were not engaging in financial statement fraud and the differences in the result can be attributed to sector disparities.  
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4.6 Assessments of Classification Accuracy of Altman and Taffler Z-Score Model. 
The classification accuracy of Altman [2000] and Taffler’s [1983] Z-Score models was evaluated using a sample 
of 19 commercial banks. The z-scores are obtained for both models using four years’ annual financial data. The 
accuracy is calculated by dividing the number of banks correctly classified by the total number of banks in the 
sample. The tenacity of Altman's [1968] study was to develop a model that could predict a corporate fate in the 
light of failed, non-failed and zone of ignorance. However, the question of the accuracy determination method was 
not dealt with due to his inability to validate his model. Therefore, in other to validate the model in different 
countries and circumstances, we deem the accuracy calculation important. To meritoriously evaluate the predictive 
ability between the two models, it is statistically appropriate to exclude the uncertainty Zone count area thus zone 
which cannot be regarded as failed or non-failed. 
Table 21 presents the results of the calculation of both Taffler [1983] and Altman [2000] model. The Altman 
model displays impressive predictive accuracy. The general drift for all the 19 commercial banks, from 2015 to 
2018 showed an average classification accuracy of 66% using the yearly classification assessment. In the case of 
using the overall average Z- scores of each bank in the study sample, the model does improve its classification 
power to 74% (see table 14). However, the model tends to misclassify one bank (type II error) in the year 2015 
representing 5%. In the case of Taffler [1983], the model does extremely well for predicting the banks with 
accuracy ranging from 95% to 100% between the year range from 2015 to 2018 with the overall predictive power 
of 95%. Similarly, the model misclassifies one non-failed bank into failed in all the years except 2015. Hence the 
model displayed a predictive error rate of 5% (see table 13). In general, it can be concluded that the predictive 
accuracy of the Taffler 1983 model is higher than that of Altman's [2000] model in the banking industry in Ghana 
with a statistical difference of 21%.  
Table 21: Assessment of Classification Accuracy of Model 1&2 excluding Grey-zone. 
YEAR ALTMAN (2000) MODEL TAFFLER (1983) MODEL 
 NO. of banks % NO. of Banks % 
2015 8 42% 19 100% 
2016 13 68% 18 95% 
2017 12 63% 18 95% 
2018 17 89% 18 95% 
AVERAGE  66%  96% 
 
USING AVERAGE Z-SCORES 14 74% 18 95% 
Source: Financial Reports (2015 – 2018). 
 
4.7 Assessment of Hypothesis.  
Taking into account the result reported in tables 8 and 9 as confirmed by tables 10 and 12, and the results shown 
in tables 14 and 15, indicate that seventy-four (74%) and ninety- five (95%) of the commercial banks showed an 
impressive Z-Score performance under Altman and Taffler models respectively and may not be said to be in any 
state of financial distress. Therefore, hypothesis H1 which states that the commercial banks are more financially 
troubled using both Altman and Taffler model following the four years under review is rejected and the alternative 
hypothesis H2 which states the understudy banks are less financially troubled using the Altman and Taffler model 
is accepted.  
The results in tables 18 and 19 as confirmed by table 20, it can be concluded that on average, seventy-nine 
(79%) of the commercial banks reported being manipulating their financial statement over the study period of four 
years. Hence, the H3 which states that the annual financials published by the commercial banks is likely to exhibit 
signs of manipulations to meet better performance is accepted and the alternative H4 which states that the annual 
financial statements published by the commercial banks were not manipulated is rejected. A summary of the 
assessment is presented in table 22. 
Table 22: summary of hypothesis assessment. 
HYPOTHESIS REMARKS 
H1    (Banks are Financially distressed) Rejected 
H2     (Banks are not Financially distressed) Accepted** 
H3    (Banks manipulate their financials) Accepted** 
H4 (Banks do not manipulate their financials) Rejected 
 
5.0 Conclusion and Recommendations 
Financial distress is a term used in finance theory to indicate that a company is incapable to meet debt covenants 
or that cash flow forecasts show that a company will shortly run out of operations [Brigham & Daves, 2004]. The 
purpose of this study was to assess the bankruptcy and financial fraud of both listed and unlisted commercial banks 
in Ghana. The study employed three models namely, Altman [2000] and Taffler [1983] thus model 1&2 which is 
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used often for assessing financial distress of non-manufacturers and companies in an emerging economy and the 
Beneish [1999] model which was devised to evaluate possibilities of financial statement fraud to evaluate the 
financial statement of 19 sampled commercial banks in Ghana. 
The outcome obtained from the computation of Altman and Taffler’s Z-Score revealed that on average 14 
(74%) and 18 (95%) of the 19 banks were in the safe zone with an average Z-Score ranges from 2.948 to 6.739 
(Model 1) and 0.238 to 2.284 (Model 2) for four-years study period. Altman model further reported 5 (26%) of 
the banks into the Zone of ignorance or grey zone with an average Z-Score range from 2.00 to 2.749 for the four-
years study period. However, both models misclassified one (5%) non-failed bank as failed based on year-on-year 
assessments representing a 5% error rate.  
The results of M-Score (Model 3) calculation revealed that the financial statements of eleven (11) representing 
58% of the banks showed signs of manipulations for the years under review whilst eight (8) representing 42% of 
the banks showed signs of financial statement manipulations for a period of three years. Therefore, none of the 
banks were found to be free from financial statement manipulations for all the study period. Hence the study 
concludes that financial statements published by the 19 sampled banks were manipulated to hide the true picture 
of their performance.  
Based on the results obtained, it is evident that commercial banks in Ghana are less financially distressed thus 
having the highest Z- Score performance. This might be the result of the bank of Ghana’s (BOG) comprehensive 
reform agenda to strengthen the regulatory and supervisory framework for a more resilient and robust banking 
sector in Ghana. As part of the measures taken by BOG to cleanse the banking sector, a new minimum capital 
requirement was set for all universal banks to meet as of 2018. This has resulted in some banks had their licenses 
withdrawn, others have been merged for their inability to raise the new minimum capital requirement. This reform 
could force banks that are financially distressed to manage or manipulates their earnings to hide the real picture of 
the bank's operations in order to mislead the public as evident in the M-Score analysis. McCarthy [2017], argued 
that a manipulated financial statement could not be detected by predictive models to accurately forecast the 
bankruptcy of companies without the Beneish M-Score Model due to the fact that earnings were manipulated in 
Enron’s financial statement prior to its collapse though Altman model predicted Enron corporation as safe from 
insolvency. Therefore, there is a high possibility that the banks that are faced with financial distress would 
manipulate their earnings by adjusting amortization, delay in recognizing expenses, recording sales early or 
capitalized on other accounting limitations or tricks that favor the bank to show better performance. 
Mulford and Comiskey [1996] defined earnings management as the vigorous manipulation of accounting 
bookkeeping for the purpose of creating an altered impression of business performance. The study, therefore, 
recommends that the Beneish model, if applied well together with the failure predictions model by researchers, 
can provide reliable findings for policymaking. The study further recommends that auditors, investors, 
management, and shareholders, when making good use of the Beneish Model, can provide potential ‘red flags’ for 
further investigations to be carried out. This exposes could prompt better audit work in order to show a true and 
fair financial position of the business. 
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APPENDIXES: 
 (A) 
DESCRIPTION OF BANKS SELECTED FOR THE STUDY 
BANK NAME BANK CODE STATUS 
TRUST BANK (THE GAMBIA) TBL LISTED ON GSE 
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK GHANA SCB LISTED ON GSE 
SOCIETE GENERALE GHANA SOGEGH LISTED ON GSE 
REPUBLIC BANK RBGH LISTED ON GSE 
GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK GCB LISTED ON GSE 
ECOBANK GHANA EGH LISTED ON GSE 
CALL BANK CAL LISTED ON GSE 
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK ADB LISTED ON GSE 
ACCESS BANK GHANA ABG LISTED ON GSE 
ZINITH BANK ZTB UNLISTED ON GSE 
STANBIC BANK GHANA SBG UNLISTED ON GSE 
UNIVERSAL MERCHANT BANK UMB UNLISTED ON GSE 
UNIVERSAL BANK OF AFRICA UBA UNLISTED ON GSE 
GUARANTEE TRUST BANK GTB UNLISTED ON GSE 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK FNB UNLISTED ON GSE 
FIDELITY BANK FBL UNLISTED ON GSE 
BANK OF AFRICA BOA UNLISTED ON GSE 
BARCLAYS BANK BAB UNLISTED ON GSE 
FIRST ATLANTIC BANK FAB UNLISTED ON GSE 
 
(B) 
 DATA PRESENTATION OF ALTMAN Z-SCORE VARIABLES  
BANK CODE YEARS WC/TA (X1) RE/TA (X2) PBT/TA 
(X3) 
EQTY/TL 
(X4) 
SALES/TA 
(X5) 
FAB 
 
2015 (0.12143) (0.00429) 0.11142 0.14476 1.11760 
2016 0.07256 0.00011 0.11414 0.16786 4.47974 
2017 0.06164 0.01787 0.08336 0.15637 6.41731 
2018 0.12206 (0.00043) 0.09331 0.22793 2.55834 
BAB 
 
2015 0.14423 0.05509 0.07136 0.19271 8.13866 
2016 0.14208 0.06209 0.08002 0.15944 5.01025 
2017 0.17362 0.08521 0.09242 0.21473 4.84931 
2018 0.14531 0.05460 0.00617 0.17467 3.28248 
BOA 
 
2015 0.33728 (0.02594) 0.03447 1.37424 1.14448 
2016 0.09908 (0.02527) 0.02195 0.16719 4.47684 
2017 0.25751 (0.01662) 0.02487 0.16324 4.63892 
2018 0.28372 (0.01258) 0.02970 0.19820 3.53988 
CAL 
 
2015 0.15768 0.06163 (0.05230) 0.17780 2.94975 
2016 0.10755 0.04027 0.00336 0.16236 2.10439 
2017 0.11797 0.06549 0.04946 0.18160 2.95850 
2018 0.14339 0.01076 0.04261 0.16473 2.99767 
EGH 
 
2015 0.03986 0.00842 0.00258 0.11045 5.53973 
2016 0.09874 0.00398 (0.00394) 0.12335 5.85622 
2017 0.08333 0.02409 0.04336 0.13907 8.55420 
2018 0.09434 0.02142 0.03506 0.13855 7.95589 
ABG 2015 0.57782 0.67737 0.11316 0.33904 1.87079 
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 2016 0.56512 0.68210 0.14909 0.26674 2.37632 
2017 0.49315 0.10253 0.00920 0.19998 3.91392 
2018 0.43687 0.10758 0.03641 0.52302 4.90046 
GCB 
 
2015 0.21676 0.02373 0.06363 0.28762 2.07451 
2016 0.17560 0.02988 0.13160 0.24874 1.68480 
2017 0.20224 0.04811 0.16137 0.29380 1.70385 
2018 0.13661 0.00195 1.74990 0.05205 1.18750 
FBL 
 
2015 0.18022 0.01161 0.05003 0.13960 3.77228 
2016 0.17523 0.00496 0.00445 0.13405 3.50107 
2017 0.20023 0.00732 0.02517 0.11029 2.83183 
2018 0.32449 0.00467 0.03451 0.10936 2.40948 
ADB 
 
2015 0.17809 0.10925 0.07566 0.21417 1.87335 
2016 0.21585 0.11578 0.07385 0.20163 2.65516 
2017 0.19150 0.08258 0.03232 0.13181 1.89697 
2018 0.11640 0.04707 0.04197 0.14237 2.78378 
FNB 
 
2015 0.80344 (0.03066) (0.03170) 0.52823 1.48567 
2016 0.40538 (0.04467) (0.02869) 0.91767 1.11141 
2017 0.45296 (0.15211) (0.10532) 1.11089 2.42491 
2018 0.69081 (0.12340) (0.05759) 2.04142 1.22672 
GTB 
 
2015 0.27248 0.02022 0.04963 0.21667 4.96005 
2016 0.26027 0.03214 0.05893 0.22323 3.59215 
2017 0.26397 0.03880 0.06998 0.25756 2.98051 
2018 0.19593 0.02937 0.07948 0.23258 8.97192 
RBGH 
 
2015 0.11611 (0.00860) (0.02367) 0.12963 1.17338 
2016 0.03807 (0.02569) (0.03071) 0.08230 3.92534 
2017 0.08196 (0.01563) 0.02725 0.12208 4.70089 
2018 0.20715 (0.02278) 0.01584 0.21087 4.41160 
SOGEGH 
 
2015 0.20687 0.02535 0.03232 0.15274 1.35859 
2016 0.18073 0.03210 0.03752 0.15714 1.34125 
2017 0.12189 0.05118 0.04553 0.22848 2.45763 
2018 0.22062 0.00882 0.03066 0.02571 2.91968 
SCB 
 
2015 0.17935 0.03133 0.02703 0.19724 6.85914 
2016 0.18693 0.05319 0.07901 0.21207 5.04808 
2017 0.20474 0.07575 0.08840 0.23877 3.70047 
2018 0.20999 0.03862 0.05466 0.21325 3.57160 
TBL 
 
2015 (0.02923) 0.02015 0.03544 0.16713 1.13696 
2016 (0.03198) 0.01842 0.02222 0.15767 2.48000 
2017 (0.02515) 0.01333 0.01962 0.12915 2.47955 
2018 (0.01713) 0.00997 0.01875 0.11652 3.78967 
UBA 
 
2015 (0.33630) 0.01690 0.03736 0.12328 3.85903 
2016 0.67968 0.00927 0.05630 0.09653 2.21839 
2017 0.23958 0.03332 0.01801 0.15838 4.06142 
2018 0.22578 0.02484 0.01541 0.11299 5.78762 
UMB 
 
 
2015 0.07453 (0.00570) (0.00040) 0.11413 0.80653 
2016 0.29799 (0.04577) 0.98163 0.06271 0.70372 
2017 0.24183 (0.03654) 0.22946 0.07656 0.96235 
2018 0.18251 (0.02818) 0.94606 0.10813 1.30783 
ZTB 
 
2015 0.13457 0.10213 0.00726 0.20549 2.26253 
2016 (0.24092) 0.11152 0.59520 0.20318 1.05153 
2017 (0.32117) 0.09830 0.53586 0.19026 0.90954 
2018 (0.49127) 0.03701 0.68523 0.18556 1.02343 
SBG 2015 0.08479 0.05682 0.10558 0.08949 1.17187 
2016 0.12237 0.04041 0.04122 0.14797 1.83862 
2017 0.16923 0.09181 0.59310 0.21114 2.43291 
2018 0.16853 0.03593 0.54126 0.20962 2.41170 
Source: Financial Reports (2015 – 2018). 
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(C) 
 DATA PRESENTATION OF TAFFLER Z-SCORE VARIABLES 
BANK CODE YEARS PBT/CL (X1) CA/TL(X2) CL/TA (X3) QA-CL/OPC-DEP (X4) 
FAB 
 
2015 0.13973 0.77383 0.79740 (1.38201) 
2016 0.13669 1.06000 0.83508 0.80085 
2017 0.09762 1.05873 0.85393 0.09396 
2018 0.11629 1.13519 0.80242 1.80337 
BAB 
 
2015 0.08593 1.16243 0.83039 1.60337 
2016 0.09512 1.04686 0.84123 2.71024 
2017 0.11340 1.20085 0.81495 3.22645 
2018 0.00730 1.16285 0.84463 3.43216 
BOA 
 
2015 0.05315 11.21326 0.64856 1.65916 
2016 0.02561 1.11564 0.85676 1.36098 
2017 0.03556 1.11296 0.69927 3.05705 
2018 0.04434 1.14263 0.66991 3.50362 
CAL 
 
2015 (0.06518) 1.13083 0.80244 3.10001 
2016 0.00409 1.07845 0.82026 1.13932 
2017 0.06094 1.09839 0.81161 2.16377 
2018 0.05517 1.06662 0.77237 2.78355 
EGH 
 
2015 0.01128 0.30076 0.22868 2.16330 
2016 (0.00467) 1.03128 0.84384 1.77970 
2017 0.04989 1.06436 0.86910 1.25927 
2018 0.04074 1.08710 0.86047 1.81962 
ABG 
 
2015 0.66331 0.26193 0.17061 1.08148 
2016 0.71881 0.21584 0.20741 0.87192 
2017 0.24104 0.75721 0.03815 10.51561 
2018 0.96896 0.82841 0.03758 10.35018 
GCB 
 
2015 0.08432 1.28727 0.75456 9.49406 
2016 0.16434 1.21923 0.80077 1.71940 
2017 0.20878 1.26166 0.77292 2.33653 
2018 2.07343 1.08387 0.84396 3.09116 
FBL 
 
2015 0.06296 1.11089 0.79459 2.24791 
2016 0.00557 1.10447 0.79869 1.69132 
2017 0.03254 1.08115 0.77352 2.85124 
2018 0.05271 1.08620 0.65464 5.34913 
ADB 
 
2015 0.09687 1.16456 0.78106 2.08787 
2016 0.09904 1.15544 0.74570 2.27264 
2017 0.04126 1.10317 0.78320 2.45193 
2018 0.04979 1.09593 0.84294 1.71295 
FNB 
 
2015 (0.31610) 0.53273 0.10029 4.66526 
2016 (0.05563) 1.76646 0.51577 3.14370 
2017 (0.22963) 1.92431 0.45865 2.13031 
2018 (0.20764) 2.94452 0.27733 5.58831 
GTB 
 
2015 0.07371 1.15065 0.67326 8.97373 
2016 0.08536 1.16282 0.69034 8.81756 
2017 0.10171 1.19716 0.68800 11.60808 
2018 0.10655 1.16090 0.74592 6.63016 
RBGH 
 
2015 (0.02874) 1.06152 0.82360 1.43503 
2016 (0.03406) 1.01681 0.90141 0.32431 
2017 0.03082 1.08402 0.88413 1.23274 
2018 0.02010 1.20495 0.78797 2.90682 
SOGEGH 
 
2015 0.04315 1.10192 0.74904 2.10459 
2016 0.04797 1.11428 0.78223 1.96420 
2017 0.05863 1.10386 0.77667 1.38758 
2018 0.04421 1.14925 0.69359 2.76404 
SCB 2015 0.03327 1.18720 0.81227 2.73862 
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 2016 0.09805 1.20329 0.80583 4.35861 
2017 0.11209 1.23058 0.78865 4.11432 
2018 0.07016 1.20005 0.77913 4.49149 
TBL 
 
2015 0.04140 0.96504 0.85608 (0.45559) 
2016 0.02574 0.96246 0.86336 (0.56178) 
2017 0.02216 0.97127 0.88533 (0.48600) 
2018 0.02094 0.98062 0.89541 (0.38636) 
UBA 
 
2015 0.04876 0.48286 0.76617 (5.83070) 
2016 3.81259 0.76148 0.01477 11.74051 
2017 0.02602 1.07909 0.69198 5.90279 
2018 0.02154 1.04763 0.71550 6.59923 
UMB 
 
2015 (0.00044) 14.56136 0.89632 2.05092 
2016 1.45691 1.03270 0.67378 5.43577 
2017 0.31377 1.04762 0.73129 3.59765 
2018 1.23462 1.05137 0.76627 1.73881 
ZTB 
 
2015 0.00876 1.16103 0.82856 1.34576 
2016 0.74514 0.67119 0.79877 (5.59794) 
2017 0.70170 0.52667 0.76366 (9.27219) 
2018 0.82974 0.39666 0.82584 (10.11426) 
SBG 2015 0.11887 1.12819 0.88822 1.46071 
2016 0.04862 1.11387 0.84793 2.36077 
2017 0.74100 1.17437 0.80041 3.13786 
2018 0.67231 1.17769 0.80508 2.70348 
        Source: Financial Reports (2015 – 2018). 
 
(D) 
   DATA PRESENTATION OF BENEISH M-SCORE VARIABLES  
Bank Code YEARS TATAI (LEVI) DSRI GMI AQI SGI DEPI SGAI 
FAB 
 
2015 (0.12736) 0.87355 2.04103 0.97086 0.99865 0.73377 1.35232 2.40772 
2016 0.06601 0.85626 0.06636 1.04322 0.94563 5.08695 0.48734 0.25299 
2017 0.05419 0.86478 0.63342 1.00198 1.00836 1.69140 1.22402 0.64019 
2018 0.11449 0.81438 3.58674 0.99103 1.00976 0.43220 1.13007 2.79471 
BAB 
 
2015 0.14108 0.83843 1.17920 0.99932 1.00119 0.96275 0.84558 1.26688 
2016 0.13933 0.93929 1.35448 0.99929 1.00356 0.90162 1.11556 0.39700 
2017 0.17083 0.82323 1.13664 0.99877 1.00158 1.08962 1.13938 0.91539 
2018 0.14339 0.85130 1.20869 0.99811 1.00405 1.02256 1.12359 1.27524 
BOA 
 
2015 0.33489 0.08792 0.17929 2.41022 1.00003 6.38383 0.95646 0.16023 
2016 0.09564 0.85676 0.68902 1.06481 0.96628 1.67454 0.32520 1.89957 
2017 0.25319 0.85967 0.93501 0.98571 0.99990 1.18592 1.22924 0.87592 
2018 0.27881 0.83458 1.55738 0.97757 0.99848 0.73187 1.08702 1.68541 
CAL 
 
2015 0.15624 0.84904 1.11722 0.99880 0.98913 1.20844 0.50356 1.19189 
2016 0.10600 0.86032 1.42081 0.98135 0.96752 0.76628 0.60635 1.62051 
2017 0.11600 0.84631 0.57291 1.01508 1.00421 1.64541 1.33485 0.67127 
2018 0.14123 0.85857 1.00738 1.00399 0.98459 1.30024 0.90282 0.92358 
EGH 
 
2015 0.03922 0.89287 0.88754 1.00020 0.99476 1.29722 0.63709 0.91423 
2016 0.09391 0.91399 3.71994 0.99584 0.96665 0.92056 1.76610 2.84838 
2017 0.08115 0.89484 0.57078 1.00380 0.99660 0.58762 0.44623 0.23342 
2018 0.09170 0.87831 1.05836 1.00011 1.00276 1.13616 1.26243 0.99402 
ABG 
 
2015 0.55174 2.85738 9.33722 0.27948 0.96126 0.26334 4.26838 4.68279 
2016 0.53623 3.57919 1.06138 1.54276 0.95274 1.40173 0.96417 1.02516 
2017 0.48761 0.70165 0.63036 1.05511 1.32267 1.37466 1.36625 0.78617 
2018 0.43175 0.57272 0.92052 1.38248 1.00887 1.35853 1.17294 0.86283 
GCB 
 
2015 0.21108 0.75456 0.71497 0.99956 1.00032 1.08425 1.71572 0.79464 
2016 0.17010 0.80081 0.74905 0.99361 1.00282 1.02993 1.07818 2.70501 
2017 0.19343 0.77291 0.73288 0.98826 0.99798 0.97713 1.32928 1.20286 
2018 0.13345 0.90470 5.37542 1.01247 1.00601 0.00710 0.57035 0.81512 
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FBL 
 
2015 0.17628 0.87750 7.28427 0.99736 1.00521 1.23136 1.07526 1.26043 
2016 0.17277 0.88179 0.93725 0.99744 0.99897 0.94159 0.63394 1.00773 
2017 0.19838 0.90067 0.74928 1.00218 1.00161 1.04227 0.82576 1.12308 
2018 0.32124 0.90142 1.24547 0.99853 1.00511 1.10997 2.09129 1.07798 
ADB 
 
2015 0.17146 0.82361 1.36596 0.99711 0.99904 0.92733 1.23488 1.04612 
2016 0.20902 0.83220 0.58409 1.00490 0.99859 1.85207 0.98845 0.75059 
2017 0.18546 0.88354 1.11474 0.99209 1.00854 1.12880 1.15741 1.12825 
2018 0.10780 0.87537 0.79365 1.00342 1.00103 1.63283 1.35224 0.59986 
FNB 
 
2015 0.79539 1.69639 - 0.99995 0.93398 5.49474 - 144.34836 
2016 0.39450 0.52147 1.67416 0.97885 0.99422 1.43924 1.22260 1.00144 
2017 0.43303 0.47373 4.33460 1.00716 0.98735 2.00035 1.47458 0.75301 
2018 0.68099 0.32879 2.38361 0.99586 1.06000 1.24505 1.26008 1.08768 
GTB 
 
2015 0.26774 0.82192 1.04040 0.99867 0.99713 1.02898 0.89016 3.02242 
2016 0.25540 0.81751 1.34736 0.99368 1.00363 0.83096 1.12438 1.34232 
2017 0.25935 0.79519 0.99597 1.00364 1.00122 0.89691 0.98708 0.92849 
2018 0.19067 0.81130 0.29187 1.00651 0.99441 2.89042 0.96908 0.43170 
RBGH 
 
2015 0.11040 0.88524 1.31378 0.97447 1.00246 1.05623 1.52684 1.76632 
2016 0.03163 0.92396 0.25096 1.04318 1.00316 3.96415 1.19334 1.17678 
2017 0.07578 0.89121 0.65632 1.00563 1.00290 1.34140 1.03870 0.47293 
2018 0.20299 0.82585 1.12464 1.00511 1.00998 1.29004 0.97993 1.14212 
SOGEGH 
 
2015 0.20162 0.86750 1.11415 0.99816 2.02244 0.91576 12.32081 0.57734 
2016 0.17614 0.86420 0.86188 0.99702 1.00785 1.21351 1.05214 0.98975 
2017 0.11704 0.81401 0.71660 1.01218 0.93335 2.08743 0.40588 0.63491 
2018 0.21398 0.79548 0.80851 1.00182 1.01739 1.46123 1.57642 0.64209 
SCB 
 
2015 0.17738 0.83525 0.79138 0.99913 0.99984 1.20539 1.03168 0.37910 
2016 0.18543 0.82504 1.08387 1.00092 1.00064 0.95529 0.86455 0.50886 
2017 0.20321 0.80725 1.37069 0.99729 1.00011 0.80066 1.02803 2.25762 
2018 0.20872 0.82424 0.86677 1.00072 0.99571 1.20450 0.55899 0.95604 
TBL 
 
2015 (0.04332) 0.85680 1.00942 0.99721 0.94267 0.98689 0.89593 0.98721 
2016 (0.04723) 0.86380 0.35272 1.02300 1.00893 2.31636 1.12979 0.49273 
2017 (0.03926) 0.88562 0.96918 1.00308 1.02171 1.18152 1.07126 0.89139 
2018 (0.03104) 0.89564 0.99269 1.00853 1.01383 1.64472 1.09156 0.51339 
UBA 
 
2015 (0.33721) 0.89025 9.47268 (9.00605) 1.03150 1.18290 3.71135 8.73201 
2016 0.67890 0.91197 1.97963 3.43736 1.00050 0.89124 0.97162 1.76830 
2017 0.23717 0.86327 0.04508 (0.03237) 0.97319 1.43412 0.42678 0.00062 
2018 0.22336 0.89848 0.59023 1.00177 1.00341 1.74557 1.11467 0.60786 
UMB 
 
2015 0.07402 0.06667 3.25811 0.99914 1.01231 0.38833 3.65321 2.10277 
2016 0.29321 0.94099 0.87329 0.91847 0.98045 0.12749 1.07849 2.58428 
2017 0.23576 0.92888 0.23028 0.99607 1.00039 1.46337 1.22781 0.79281 
2018 0.17408 0.90242 0.65000 1.02942 0.97830 1.14870 0.75147 1.08320 
ZTB 
 
2015 0.13191 0.82954 0.67250 0.97468 0.96989 1.33214 0.22622 2.53507 
2016 (0.24352) 0.83113 1.37128 1.52304 0.99589 0.75074 0.88351 0.59038 
2017 (0.32390) 0.84015 0.66921 1.15270 0.99854 1.18811 1.01343 1.08840 
2018 (0.49446) 0.84348 0.67930 0.84945 1.00718 1.34113 1.37946 1.09376 
SBG 2015 0.08108 0.86244 0.21917 1.01192 0.99845 4.25887 0.94960 0.27222 
2016 0.11819 0.87110 2.70408 0.99341 1.01398 1.63100 1.96709 1.91773 
2017 0.16338 0.82567 0.86830 1.00407 0.99847 1.28730 1.09252 0.57179 
2018 0.16286 0.82671 1.17972 1.00169 1.00077 1.16867 1.10107 1.60285 
Source: Financial Reports (2015 – 2018). 
 
  
